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Abstract—This paper studies the physical layer security (PLS)
of a vehicular network employing reconfigurable intelligent
surfaces (RISs). RIS technologies are emerging as an important
paradigm for the realisation of next-generation smart radio
environments, where large numbers of small, low-cost and passive
elements, reflect the incident signal with an adjustable phase shift
without requiring a dedicated energy source. Inspired by the
promising potential of RIS-based transmission, we investigate
the PLS of two vehicular network system models: One with
vehicle-to-vehicle communication with the source employing a
RIS-based access point, and the other is in the form of a
vehicular adhoc network (VANET), with a RIS-based relay
deployed on a building; both models assume the presence of
an eavesdropper. The performance of the proposed systems are
evaluated in terms of the average secrecy capacity (ASC) and the
secrecy outage probability (SOP). We present accurate analytical
expressions for the two performance metrics and study the impact
of various system parameters on the overall performance of the
two considered system configurations. Monte-Carlo simulations
are provided throughout to validate the results. The results show
that performance of the system in terms of the ASC and SOP is
affected by the location of the RIS-relay as well as the number
of RIS cells. Moreover, upto an order magnitude gain could be
achieved within certain regions when the number of RIS cells
are doubled, clearly indicating the benefit of employing a RIS
configuration.
Index Terms—Beyond 5G, physical layer security, reconfig-
urable intelligent surfaces, secrecy capacity, secrecy outage prob-
ability, vehicular communications, vehicular networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs), otherwise known
as Large Intelligent Surfaces, Intelligent Reflecting Surfaces,
reflector-arrays or intelligent walls, have recently gained much
research attention for beyond 5G technology applications. This
emerging communication paradigm is considered a potential
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enabling technology in realising the concept of “smart radio
environments” employed at the physical layer to control the
propagation environment in order to improve signal quality
and coverage [1], [2]. RISs are man-made surfaces of
electromagnetic material (known as a metasurface) that are
electronically controlled with integrated electronics and have
unique wireless communication capabilities [3]. These man-
made surfaces are composed of arrays of passive scattering
elements with specially designed physical structures, where
each scattering element can be controlled in a software-
defined manner to change the phase shift and other signal
characteristics, of the incident signals on the scattering ele-
ments [4]. The possibility of controlling the reflective interface
converts the traditional random radio environment into a smart
space to support several applications beneficial to wireless
communications [3], [5], [6].
RIS-based transmission concepts have been shown
to be completely different from existing multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO), beamforming and amplify-and-
forward/decode-and-forward relaying paradigms. The large
number of small, low-cost and passive elements on a RIS,
only reflect the incident signal with an adjustable phase
shift without requiring a dedicated energy source for RF
processing or retransmission [7], which is particularly
beneficial for its energy efficiency feature. Key benefits of the
RIS-enabled communication in beyond 5G applications have
been investigated with respect to the propagation channel
[8]–[10], energy efficiency [11], [12], signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) maximisation [7], improving signal coverage [13],
improving massive MIMO systems [14]–[16], improved
interference suppression capability [17], [18], beamforming
optimisation [19]–[22] and multi-user networks [11], [23],
[24], for enhanced capacity, spectral efficiency and higher
rates. Benefits have also been demonstrated for RIS-assisted
physical layer security (PLS) [25]–[29] purposes, due to
the flexibility of simultaneously enhancing or suppressing
signal beams to different users [4]. It is worth noting that,
PLS is achieved by employing the inherent characteristics of
the propagation channels, such as interference, fading and
noise to realise keyless secure transmission through signal
processing approaches.
With regards to PLS in vehicular communications,
the rapid advancements towards autonomous vehicles and
smart/cognitive transportation networks, have made the secu-
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2rity of vehicular networks become even more important in
order to ensure safety and minimise the risk of abuse or attacks
[30]–[33]. Although several researchers have studied PLS in
vehicular networks without the use of RISs [34]–[38], or non-
vehicular RIS-assisted PLS for wireless applications [4], none
of these works studied PLS of RIS-enabled vehicular networks
as well as PLS of such networks.
Inspired by the promising potential of RIS-based trans-
mission for both PLS and vehicular network communication,
as well as the importance of security to vehicular networks,
this paper is therefore dedicated to studying the PLS of two
vehicular network models. We first consider a vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) network with the source employing a RIS-based
access point (for transmission), and in the second model we
consider a vehicular adhoc network (VANET), with a RIS-
based relay deployed on a building. Both models assume the
presence of an eavesdropper. The performance of the proposed
systems are evaluated in terms of the average secrecy capacity
(ASC) and the secrecy outage probability (SOP).
There is a four-fold motivation for this research. Firstly,
RIS-based technologies can be targeted for mobile nodes
in vehicular networks due to the ease of deployability and
flexible configuration that allows for deployment in several
shapes, locations and sizes, from tens to hundreds of cells
[3]. Secondly, existing RIS related literature have shown that
most RIS-enabled applications are designed with the RIS as a
reflector [3], [4], since the key benefit of employing a RIS is to
control the radio environment for transmissions through smart
reflections. However, other studies have adopted the RIS as a
transmitter (or access point) [3], [7] or RIS as a signal receiver
[39]. In this research, we consider two models adopting the
RIS as a reflector and as a transmitter as applicable to vehicular
networks. Thirdly, the mobility effect of nodes have been
shown to impact the performance of vehicular nodes (see for
e.g., [40]), although several previous studies assume quasi-
static node positions due to ease of analysis. It has however
been shown recently, that rapid fluctuations in the received
signal strength due to the doppler effect can be effectively
reduced by using the real-time tuneable RISs1 [41]. Fourthly,
the need for accurate analytical analysis for easily determining
PLS parameters given that the existing literature on RIS-
assisted PLS for non-vehicular applications have only reported
some initial simulation results [4].
From the aforementioned, this study therefore presents the
following contributions:
• We present a novel analysis of possible implementation
of RIS to vehicular networks. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, this is the first analysis of RIS-enabled ve-
hicular networks, as well as the first time study of the
PLS of such networks.
• We study the PLS of two possible vehicular network
models. The first model considers a V2V network with
the source vehicle employing a RIS-based access point
(AP) for transmission. In the second model, we consider
1This study will not go into detail on the process of mitigating doppler
effects with RISs. The reader is however referred to [41] for a more detailed
analysis.
a VANET with a source station transmission via a RIS-
based relay. Such a RIS-relay could be deployed on a
building as part of a smart infrastructure within a smart
city environment.
• The PLS analysis is achieved by analyzing and deriving
expressions for the ASC and the SOP of the system. The
derived expressions allow for the ease of investigation of
key system parameters.
• For the ASC, accurate closed-form approximations are
further presented to make the analysis of key parameters
more tractable. On comparison with the exact derived
expressions, it will be observed that these approxima-
tions are highly accurate within the regions of interest.
Moreover, with the approximate expressions, it becomes
easier to gain insights into the behavior of the considered
scenarios.
• The distances of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes
are taken into account along with realistic fading sce-
narios considered for the base stations and the vehicular
mobile nodes.
For all the scenarios considered in this work, Monte Carlo
simulations are provided to verify the accuracy of the analysis.
The results show that the performance of the system in terms
of the secrecy capacity is improved with the use of the RIS.
Furthermore, the effect of the system parameters such as
source power, eavesdropper distance and number of RIS cells
on the system performance are investigated. Mathematical
functions and notations are presented in Table I.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections II and III,
we describe the two system models under study and analyze
the secrecy performance by deriving accurate analytical ex-
pressions for efficient computation of the secrecy capacity of
the networks. Thereafter, in Sections IV and V, we present
the results with discussions and outline the main conclusions,
respectively.
Mathematical Functions and Notations
The following notations are used:
Notation Definition
E [·] Expectation operator
Gs,tu,v (x | · · · ) Meijer’s G-function [42, Eq. (9.302)]
Γ (z) =
´∞
0
tz−1e−tdt, the gamma function
[43, Eq. (8.310)]
erf (x) = 2√
pi
´ x
0
e−t
2
dt, the error function
[43, Eq. (8.250.1)]
2F1 (α;β; γ; z) Gauss hypergeometric function [43,
Eq. (9.111)]
Kv (z) Modified Bessel function of the
second kind and vth order [43, Eq.
(8.407)]
MX (z) = E
[
e−zX
]
, the moment generating
function of X .
f (γ) Probability density function of γ.
3II. V2V WITH RIS AS ACCESS POINT
In this section, we describe the V2V network with RIS as
AP and derive expressions for the ASC and SOP of the system.
A. System Description
We consider a system of vehicles operating in a network as
shown in Fig. 1. We assume a classic Wyner’s wiretap model
in our analysis [44], such that an information source vehicle
(S), sends confidential information to a destination vehicle
(D), while a passive eavesdropper vehicle (E) attempts to
receive and decode the confidential information. The vehicles
D and E are known to lie within a certain radius from S, the
precise relative distances of the V2V links are unknown during
transmission, which is a realistic assumption for a network
of this nature [34], [45]. Moreover, S is assumed to employ
a RIS-based scheme in the form of an AP to communicate
over the network2. As shown in the block diagram of Fig. 2,
the RIS can be connected over a wired link or optical fiber
for direct transmission from S, and can support transmission
without RF processing. For the system considered, we assume
an intelligent AP with the RIS having knowledge of channel
phase terms, such that the RIS-induced phases can be adjusted
to maximize the received SNR through appropriate phase
cancellations and proper alignment of reflected signals from
the intelligent surface.
The received signals at D and E are respectively represented
as
yD =
[
N∑
n=1
hD,ne
−jφn
]
x+ wD, (1)
yE =
[
N∑
n=1
hE,ne
−jφn
]
x+ wE , (2)
where x represents the transmitted signal by S with power
Ps, while the terms wD and wE are the respective additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at D and E, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we denote the power spectral
density of the AWGN as N0 and equal at both links. The
terms hi,n =
√
gi,nr
−β
i , i ∈ {D,E}, is the channel
coefficient from S to the receiving vehicles D and E, where
ri is the V2V link distance, β is the path-loss exponent
and gi,n is the channel gain from the RIS to the receiver,
following independent double Rayleigh fading [34]. The term
φn is the reconfigurable phase induced by the nth reflector
of the RIS, which through phase matching, the SNR of
the received signals can be maximized3. It is worth noting
that the electromagnetic signal reconfiguration capability of
the RIS is achieved by a joint phase control of individual
RIS cells. It is possible to implement a type of software-
defined control mechanism as proposed in [46], where tunable
chips are integrated within the RIS cells, such that each chip
communicates to a central controller [47], [48], or the RIS
2Initial proposal and results for such a configuration of intelligent surfaces
employed as a transmitter or access point was reported in [7].
3For the sake of brevity, the reader is referred to [7], for details of phase
cancellation mathematical techniques.
Figure 1: System model for V2V scenario with the source vehicle using
RIS as AP.
Figure 2: Vehicle RIS configuration as an AP.
could be fitted with sensors to receive for intelligent control,
in-line with environmental factors [1].
Based on (1) and (2), the instantaneous SNRs at D and E
are given by
γD =
∑N
n=1 Ps | hD,n |2
N0
, (3)
and
γE =
∑N
n=1 Ps | hE,n |2
N0
. (4)
B. Average Secrecy Capacity
In this section, we derive analytical expressions for the ASC
of the system. The maximum achievable secrecy capacity is
defined by [49]
Cs = max {CD − CE , 0} , (5)
where CD = log2 (1 + γD) and CE = log2 (1 + γE) are
the instantaneous capacities of the main and eavesdropping
links, respectively. The secrecy capacity in (5) can therefore
be expressed as [49]
Cs =
{
log2 (1 + γD)− log2 (1 + γE) , γD > γE ,
0, γD < γE .
(6)
The ASC Cs is given by [?]
Cs = E [Cs (γD, γE)]
=
∞ˆ
0
∞ˆ
0
Cs (γD, γE) f (γD, γE) dγDdγE , (7)
where E [·] is the expectation operator and f (γD, γE) is the
joint PDF of γD and γE . In order to simplify the analysis, we
4express the logarithmic function in (5) in an alternate form.
Recalling the identity [50, Eq. (6)]
ln (1 + ζ) =
∞ˆ
0
1
s
(
1− e−ζs) e−sds, (8)
and by substituting ζ = γD in (8), we can express the
instantaneous capacity of the main link as
CD =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−MD (z)) e−zdz, (9)
where MD (z) = E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
D
N0
∑N
n=1 gD,n
]
is the moment
generating function (MGF) of the SNR at D.
Next, we compute the MGF MD (z), defined by
MD (z) =E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
D
N0
∑N
n=1 gD,n
]
=
N∏
n=1
E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
D
N0
gD,n
]
=
N∏
n=1
ˆ
gD
e−zξDgD,nfgD (g)dgD, (10)
then from the generalized cascaded Rayleigh distribution, we
can obtain the PDF of the double Rayleigh channel for n = 2
in [51, Eq. (8)] as f (g) = G2,00,2
(
1
4g
2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12
)
. By invoking
[43, Eq. (9.34.3)], we can express the PDF by re-writing the
Meijer G-function in an alternate form. Thus, we get
f (g) = G2,00,2
(
1
4
g2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12
)
= gK0 (g) . (11)
Using (11) and [43, Eq. (6.621.3)] along with some basic
algebraic manipulations, we can obtain the desired result as
MD (z) =
N∏
n=1
4
3(1 + z
Psr
−β
D
N0
)2
2F1
2, 1
2
,
5
2
,
z
Psr
−β
D
N0
− 1
z
Psr
−β
D
N0
+ 1
 .
(12)
Using similar analysis, the average capacity of the eaves-
dropper link can be represented as
CE =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−ME (z)) e−zdz, (13)
where the MGF ME (z) = E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
E
N0
∑N
n=1 gE
]
and can
be similarly evaluated as
ME (z) =
N∏
n=1
4
3(1 + z
Psr
−β
E
N0
)2
2F1
2, 1
2
,
5
2
,
z
Psr
−β
E
N0
− 1
z
Psr
−β
E
N0
+ 1
 .
(14)
From (6), (9), (12) - (14), the ASC can be represented as
(15), shown at the top of the next page.
C. Approximate Secrecy Capacity
In this section, we present an approximate solution to the
ASC computed in Sec. II-B, in order to provide a more direct
solution. From (6), it can be seen that the secrecy capacity
is defined as a logarithmic function. Thus, we can define an
approximate bound to the solution in (15) by invoking Jensen’s
inequality4 [52, pp. 453] and applying to the expressions for
the instantaneous capacities of the main and eavesdropping
links. Therefore, the average capacity at D is
E [log2 (1 + γD)] ≤ log2 (1 + E [γD])
= log2
(
1 + E
[
Psr
−β
D
N0
N∑
n=1
gD,n
])
= log2
(
1 +
Psr
−β
D
N0
E
[
N∑
n=1
gD,n
])
,
(16)
where γD is defined in (3). By using (11), the expectation in
(16) can be obtained as
E
[
N∑
n=1
gD,n
]
=
∞ˆ
0
N∑
n=1
gD,ngDK0 (gD) dgD
(a)
= N
pi
2
, (17)
where (a) in (17) was obtained with the aid of [43, Eq.
(6.521.10)]. From (16) and (17), we obtain a bounded ex-
pression for the average capacity at D as
C
aprx
D = log2
(
1 +
NpiPsr
−β
D
2N0
)
. (18)
Using similar analysis to the derivation of (18), we obtain
a bounded expression for the average capacity at E as
C
aprx
E = log2
(
1 +
NpiPsr
−β
E
2N0
)
. (19)
From (6), (18) and (19), we obtained the desired bounded
expression as
C
aprx
s = log2
(
2N0 +NpiPsr
−β
D
2N0 +NpiPsr
−β
E
)
. (20)
It is worth noting that, in addition to the fact that (20)
lends itself much more easily to analysis as compared to
(15), the expression (20) also produces highly accurate results
for the parameters of interest, as will be demonstrated in the
discussion in Sec. IV.
D. Secrecy Outage Probability
In this section, we derive an expression for the SOP of the
V2V RIS AP model. The SOP is defined as the probability
that the secrecy capacity falls below a target secrecy rate [35].
This can be represented as
Po = Pr [Cs < cth] (21)
4Jensen’s inequality asserts that, if f (x) is a convex function, then
E [f (X)] ≥ f (E [X]), provided that the expectations exist and are finite.
5Cs =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e−z

1−
 43(N0 + zPsr−βD )2 2F1
(
2,
1
2
,
5
2
,
zPsr
−β
D −N0
zPsr
−β
D +N0
)
N
−
1−
 43(N0 + zPsr−βE )2 2F1
(
2,
1
2
,
5
2
,
zPsr
−β
E −N0
zPsr
−β
E +N0
)
N
 dz. (15)
where cth is the pre-determined target secrecy rate. From (6)
and (21) we obtain
Po = Pr
[
log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γE
)
< cth
]
= Pr
[
1 + γD
1 + γE
< 2cth
]
(b)
= Pr
[
Psr
−β
D
N∑
n=1
gD,n < ν
(
N0 + Psr
−β
E
N∑
n=1
gE,n
)
−N0
]
= Pr
 N∑
n=1
gD,n <
ν
(
N0 + Psr
−β
E
∑N
n=1 gE,n
)
−N0
Psr
−β
D

(c)
= Pr

N∑
n=1
gD,n <
N0 (ν − 1)
Psr
−β
D
+
νr−βE
r−βD
N∑
n=1
gE,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
,
 (22)
where (b) follows from substituting (3) and (4) and ν = 2cth .
Given the difficulty in obtaining a tractable expression for
the distribution of the sum
∑N
n=1 gD,n in (c) of (22), we
employ an appropriate approximation using the central limit
theorem (CLT) for reasonably large number of reflecting cells
when N  1. It therefore follows that ∑Nn=1 gD,n can
be approximated by a Gaussian distribution with parameters;
mean µ = N pi2 (from (17)) and variance σ
2 given by
Var
[
N∑
n=1
gD,n
]
= E
[
N∑
n=1
g2D,n
]
− E
[
N∑
n=1
gD,n
]2
= N
(
4− pi
2
4
)
. (23)
Thus from (22), the SOP can be given by
Po ≈ 1
2
(
1 + erf
(
Θ − µ√
2σ
))
, (24)
where Θ is defined in (22) and E [Θ] can be computed as
E [Θ] = E
[
N0 (ν − 1)
Psr
−β
D
+
νr−βE
r−βD
N∑
n=1
gE,n
]
= E
[
N0 (ν − 1)
Psr
−β
D
+
νr−βE
r−βD
N∑
n=1
gE,n
]
(d)
=
N0 (ν − 1)
Psr
−β
D
+
νNpir−βE
2r−βD
, (25)
Figure 3: System model for a vehicular network scenario. Source station
using building-mounted-RIS as relay for vehicular communication.
where (d) in (25) follows from (17) with E
[∑N
n=1 gE,n
]
=
N pi2 . The SOP for the V2V RIS access point is thus
Po ≈ 1
2
1 + erf
 N0(ν−1)Psr−βD +N pi2
(
νr−βE
r−βD
− 1
)
√
2N
(
4− pi24
)

 . (26)
III. VANET TRANSMISSION THROUGH RIS RELAY
In this section, we describe the VANET system transmitting
through a RIS relay and derive expressions for the ASC and
SOP of the system.
A. System Description
In this section, we consider an RIS-based scheme with the
RIS employed as a relay or reflector for vehicular nodes in
the network. Fig. 3 illustrates the RIS-based system under
consideration. The RIS is deployed on a building and used
as a relay for the signal from stationary source S, while D
and E are assumed to be highly mobile vehicular nodes. Under
this assumption, the source-to-RIS channel gs is assumed to
be Rayleigh faded, while the RIS-to-destination and RIS-to-
eavesdropper fading channels, gD and gE are assumed to
be double-Rayleigh distributed. The RIS is in the form of a
reflect-array comprising N reconfigurable reflector elements,
capable of being controlled by a communication oriented
software for intelligent transmission. With this in mind, the
received signals at D and E are
yi =
[
N∑
n=1
hshi,ne
−jφn
]
x+ wi, i ∈ {D,E}, (27)
6where hs,n =
√
gs,nr
−β
s e−jθn is the source-to-RIS chan-
nel with distance rs, phase component θn and gs fol-
lowing a Rayleigh fading distribution. The term hi,n =√
gi,nr
−β
i e
−jψn , i ∈ {D,E}, is the channel coefficient
from RIS-to-vehicle node, with distance ri, path-loss exponent
β, phase component ψn and gi,n following a double-Rayleigh
distribution to model the mobility of the nodes [34]. The
instantaneous SNRs at D and E are given respectively by
γrD =
∑N
n=1 Ps | hs,n |2| hD,n |2
N0
(28)
and
γrE =
∑N
n=1 Ps | hs,n |2| hE,n |2
N0
(29)
B. Average Secrecy Capacity Analysis
From (9), we obtain the average capacity for the destination
V2V link as
CD,r =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−MD,r (z)) e−zdz, (30)
where MD,r (z) = E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0
∑N
n=1 gs,ngD,n
]
is the
MGF of the SNR at D. As for the joint distribution of
gs and gD, given that gs is a Rayleigh RV and gD is a
double-Rayleigh RV, we can define the RV g = gsgD, which
follows the cascaded Rayleigh distribution with n = 3. From
the generalized cascaded Rayleigh distribution [51], we can
evaluate the PDF of g as
f (g) =
1√
2
G3,00,3
(
1
8
g2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12 ,12
)
. (31)
Thus, the MD,r (z) is given by
MD,r (z) =E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0
∑N
n=1 gs,ngD,n
]
=
N∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
e−zg
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0 fg(g)dg
=
N∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
1√
2
e−zg
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0 G3,00,3
(
1
8
g2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12 ,12
)
dg.
(32)
Using (31) and [43, Eq. (7.813.2)] along with some basic
algebraic manipulations, we can obtain the MGF as
MD,r (z) =
N∏
n=1
1
zµd
√
2pi
G3,22,3
(
1
2 (zµd)
2
∣∣∣∣∣ 0, 1212 ,12 ,12
)
, (33)
where µd =
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0
. Using similar analysis, the average
capacity of the eavesdropper link can be represented as
CE,r =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−ME,r (z)) e−zdz, (34)
where the MGF ME,r (z) = E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
s r
−β
E
N0
∑N
n=1 gs,ngE,n
]
and can be similarly evaluated as
ME,r (z) =
N∏
n=1
1
zµe
√
2pi
G3,22,3
(
1
2 (zµe)
2
∣∣∣∣∣ 0, 1212 ,12 ,12
)
, (35)
where µe =
Psr
−β
s r
−β
e
N0
.
From (6), (30), (33) - (35), the ASC can be represented as
(36), shown at the top of the next page.
C. Approximate Secrecy Capacity
In this section, we present an approximate expression to
the ASC for the VANET transmission through RIS relay, as
computed in Sec. III-B. Following similar analysis to the
derivation of an approximate expression in Sec. II-C, we
invoke Jensen’s inequality to obtain a bound for the expression
in (36). We commence with the average capacity at D, which
can be approximated as
E [log2 (1 + γrD)] ≤ log2 (1 + E [γrD])
= log2
(
1 + E
[
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0
N∑
n=1
gs,ngD,n
])
= log2
(
1 +
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0
E
[
N∑
n=1
gs,ngD,n
])
,
(37)
where γrD is defined in (28), as the instantaneous SNR at D
for the VANET RIS relay network. Given that the channels gs
and gD are independent, then the expectation in (37) can be
obtained as
E
[
N∑
n=1
gs,ngD,n
]
=
N∑
n=1
E [gs,n]E [gD,n]
(d)
=
∞ˆ
0
∞ˆ
0
N∑
n=1
g2sg
2
DK0 (gD) e
− g
2
s
2 dgDdgs
(e)
= N
(pi
2
) 3
2
, (38)
where (d) in (38) was obtained using (11) and the fact that
gs is Rayleigh distributed with PDF f (gs) = gs exp
(
1
2g
2
s
)
,
while (e) was obtained with the aid of [43, Eqs. (6.521.10)
and (3.326.2)]. From (37) and (38), we obtain a bounded
expression for the average capacity at D for the VANET RIS
relay as
C
aprx
D,r = log2
(
1 +
NPs (pi)
3
2 r−βs r
−β
D
2
√
2N0
)
. (39)
Using similar analysis to the derivation of (39), we obtain
a bounded expression for the average capacity at E for the
VANET RIS relay as
C
aprx
E,r = log2
(
1 +
NPs (pi)
3
2 r−βs r
−β
E
2
√
2N0
)
. (40)
7Cs,r =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e−z
1−{ N0√
2pizPsr
−β
s r
−β
D
G3,22,3
(
1
2
(
N0
zPsr
−β
s r
−β
D
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣ 0, 1212 ,12 ,12
)}N
−
1−{ N0
zPsr
−β
s r
−β
E
√
2pi
G3,22,3
(
1
2
(
N0
zPsr
−β
s r
−β
E
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣ 0, 1212 ,12 ,12
)}N dz. (36)
From (6), (39) and (40), we obtained the desired bounded
expression for the VANET RIS relay as
C
aprx
s,r = log2
(
2
√
2N0 +NPs (pi)
3
2 r−βs r
−β
D
2
√
2N0 +NPs (pi)
3
2 r−βs r−βE
)
. (41)
The accuracy of (41) as compared to the exact analytical
solution in (36) will be demonstrated in the discussion in Sec.
IV.
D. Secrecy Outage Probability
In this section, we derive an expression for the SOP of the
VANET RIS relay system. Similar to the derivation in Sec.
II-D, from (6) and (21) we obtain
P ro = Pr
[
log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γE
)
< cth
]
= Pr
[
1 + γD
1 + γE
< 2cth
]
(f)
= Pr
[
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N∑
n=1
gs,ngD,n <
ν
(
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−β
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−β
E
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n=1
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)
−N0
]
(g)
= Pr
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N∑
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N0 (ν − 1)
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−β
s r
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D
+
νr−βE
r−βD
N∑
n=1
gs,ngE,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θr
,

(42)
where ν = 2cth and (f) follows from (28) and (29). Owing
to the difficulty in obtaining a direct expression for the
distribution of the sum
∑N
n=1 gs,ngD,n in (g) of (42), we
employ the CLT to approximate with a Gaussian distribution
with parameters; mean µr = N
(
pi
2
) 3
2 (from (38)) and variance
σ2r given by
Var
[
N∑
n=1
gs,ngD,n
]
= E
[
N∑
n=1
g2s,ng
2
D,n
]
− E
[
N∑
n=1
gs,ngD,n
]2
= N
(
8−
(pi
2
) 3
2
)
. (43)
Thus from (42), the SOP can be given by
Po ≈ 1
2
(
1 + erf
(
Θr − µr√
2σr
))
, (44)
where Θr is defined in (42) and E [Θr] can be computed as
E [Θr] = E
[
N0 (ν − 1)
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+
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where (h) in (45) follows from (38) with
E
[∑N
n=1 gs,ngE,n
]
= Npi
3
2
√
2
. The SOP for the VANET
RIS relay system is therefore
P ro ≈
1
2
1 + erf

N0(ν−1)
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
+ Npi
3
2
√
2
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r−βD
− 1
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√
2N
(
8− (pi2 ) 32)

 .
(46)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present and discuss some results from
the mathematical expressions derived in the paper. We then
investigate the effects of key parameters on the secrecy capac-
ity of the system. The results are then verified using Monte
Carlo simulations with at least 104 iterations. Unless otherwise
stated, we have assumed source power Ps = 10W, RIS-to-D
distance rD = 4m, RIS-to-E distance rE = 8m, source-to-RIS
distance rs = 10m, secrecy outage threshold cth = 1 bit/Hz
and path loss exponent β = 2.7.
A. Average Secrecy Capacity
In this subsection, we examine the ASC of both system
models considered. In Fig. 4, we commence analysis for the
V2V network model, with the ASC against source power for
different numbers of RIS cells and eavesdropper distances. It
can be observed that the secrecy capacity increases with an
increase in Ps, rE or N . It can be further noted that within
the region considered, the eavesdropper distance has a greater
effect on the secrecy capacity than doubling the number of
RIS cells. Also, the effect of increased RIS cells, is more
pronounced when the eavesdropper is further away. A similar
analysis can be made for the ASC of the VANET RIS-relay
model considered, as observed in Fig. 5. However, the effect of
increased source power produces an almost linear response for
the secrecy capacity, while the effective value of the secrecy
capacity is much lower than the V2V RIS model for similar
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Figure 4: Average secrecy capacity versus source transmit power Ps for
the V2V network with RIS as AP. Parameters considered with varying
eavesdropper distance rE and number of RIS cells N .
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Figure 5: Average secrecy capacity versus source transmit power Ps
for the VANET with RIS as relay. Parameters considered with varying
eavesdropper distance rE and number of RIS cells N .
Ps. In both Figs. 4 and 5, it can also be observed that the
analytical results in (20) and (41) provide highly accurate
approximations for the secrecy capacity of the V2V RIS model
and VANET RIS-relay model respectively.
Fig. 6, shows a plot of the ASC against rs with different
values of Ps and N , for the VANET RIS-relay system. We
assume the RIS-to-eavesdropper distance to be rE = 12m.
First, we observe that the ASC decreases as the source distance
increases, demonstrating the effect of fading and path loss on
the link, before the RIS relay.
The result also demonstrates that doubling the number of
RIS cells has less influence on the ASC, as compared to
the impact of the source power, within the observed region.
Furthermore, we again observe the high accuracy of the
approximate expressions in (41), within the regions of interest
studied in these results.
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Figure 6: Average secrecy capacity versus source-to-RIS distance for the
VANET with RIS as relay. Parameters considered with varying source
transmit power Ps and number of RIS cells N .
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Figure 7: Secrecy outage probability versus source transmit power Ps for
the V2V network with RIS as AP. Parameters considered with varying
secrecy capacity threshold cth and number of RIS cells N .
B. Average Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we present results for the average SOP
of both systems considered from the expressions derived. In
Fig. 7, the SOP of the V2V RIS access point is plotted against
the source transmit power for different threshold values and
numbers of RIS cells. From the plot, we observe that the SOP
decreases with increased transmit power or increase number
of RIS cells, resulting from stronger SNR conditions. On the
other hand, the SOP is proportional to the threshold within the
region investigated, as expected. We can particularly observe
that the SOP performance is affected more significantly when
the threshold is at 1.5 bit/Hz compared to 1 bit/Hz, such
that over half an order of magnitude gain in performance is
possible, when the RIS cells are doubled from N = 16 to 32,
in some regions of operation for this system model.
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Figure 8: Secrecy outage probability versus secrecy capacity threshold
cth for the VANET with RIS as relay. Parameters considered with varying
source transmit power Ps and number of RIS cells N .
The effect of the system parameters on the SOP for the
VANET with RIS relay system is illustrated in Figs. 8 and 9.
In Fig. 8, the SOP for the VANET with RIS is plotted against
the expected secrecy threshold, for different values of source
transmit power and number of RIS cells. It can be observed
that for this model, the system performance is degraded
(increased SOP) when we adopt higher threshold values for
all corresponding values of N and Ps. It is interesting to see
that, the effect of doubling the number of cells from N = 16
to 32 at a fixed transmit power is more pronounced than
doubling the power from Ps = 20 to 40 W, with respect
to the SOP. In Fig. 9, the SOP for the VANET with RIS
is plotted against the source-to-RIS distance, where the SOP
curves show decreased performance when rs increases and that
the SOP rapidly degrades within a short distance. For example,
it can be shown that within the regions observed, the SOP falls
by about an order of magnitude (from SOP = 1 to 0.1) for a
change of less than 2 m. Moreover, we observe in this case,
the effect of changing N = 16 to 32 at a fixed transmit power
is similar to increasing the power from Ps = 20 to 40 W, with
respect to the SOP.
Therefore, from a practical perspective, the results in Figs.
8 and 9 indicate that there is a design decision to consider
the cost versus benefit of extra hardware required to double
the RIS cells or the source transmit power, while noting that
for some applications the number of RIS cells could be much
larger than 100. (i.e. N >> 100).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examined the effects of key parameters
on the PLS of a wireless vehicular communication network.
As a novel study on the subject, two scenarios of a RIS-based
vehicular network were considered. The results demonstrate
how the secrecy capacity and SOP of a vehicular network can
be improved with respect to the source power, eavesdropper
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Figure 9: Secrecy outage probability versus source-to-RIS distance for
the VANET with RIS as relay. Parameters considered with varying source
transmit power Ps and number of RIS cells N .
distance, the number of RIS cells, the source-to-relay distance
and the secrecy threshold. The results further showed how
the location and size of RIS (in terms of number of RIS cells)
can be employed to improve a RIS relay-based VANET, while
clearly indicating the benefits of employing the RIS in all
cases.
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